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Abstract 
Public discussions about fertility trends and policies in developed 
countries refer almost exclusively to the period Total Fertility Rate (TFR), 
which is commonly misinterpreted as the ‘mean number of children per 
woman’ as if it were a cohort measure of fertility. We argue that the use of 
this indicator frequently leads to incorrect interpretations of period fertility 
levels and trends, resulting in distorted policy conclusions and, potentially, 
in misguided policies. We illustrate this point with four policy-relevant 
examples, drawn from contemporary Europe. These illustrations show that 
the TFR (a) inflates the presumed gap between fertility intentions and 
realised fertility, (b) erroneously suggests a significant fertility increase in 
many countries of Europe after the year 2000, (c) often exaggerates the level 
of immigrants’ fertility and (d) frequently suggests that family-related 
policies which led to shorter birth spacing in fact brought an upward swing 
in fertility level. We argue that there seems to be no policy-relevant question 
for which the period TFR would be the indicator of choice to be preferred 
over other existing measures, which range from measures related to future 
cohort size (total number of births) to sophisticated fertility indexes 
controlling for age, parity, duration since previous birth and tempo effect. 
Hence, there is a strong case for stopping the use of the period TFR as a one-
fits-all fertility indicator which is now common practice.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 Demography has been in the headlines in Europe for many years and 
is being discussed in the highest policy circles. The European Commission 
has set up several bodies that discuss the “demographic challenge” which 
Commission President Barroso calls one of the three main challenges for 
Europe, and in 2006 it published an official communication on the topic that 
was presented to the media under the catching title “Five ways to defuse the 
demographic time bomb” (European Commission 2006). The main policy 
paradigm conveyed in this communication as well as in speeches by family 
ministers around Europe is that young people want to have significantly 
more children than they actually can afford to have and that the role of 
policy is to help them meet their family size desires. The resolution of the 
European Parliament on the demographic future of Europe (21 February 
2008) proposes that “the average birth rate in the European Union, which at 
1.5 is abnormally low, is not a reflection of women’s choice or of European 
citizens’ actual aspirations for creating a family.” As we will discuss below, 
this dominant and politically in many respects most convenient policy 
paradigm is largely based on an inappropriate use of the period Total 
Fertility Rate (TFR) which is compared with the cohort measure of desired 
family size as if it were itself a cohort measure of fertility. The same 
problem is found with another policy message that is being spread in Europe, 
namely the reversal of the declining fertility trends. Many politicians point at 
recent increases in the TFR as proof of their successful policies. In this paper 
we show that this trend often cannot be interpreted as a major turnaround in 
fertility because it is largely a consequence of the expected end of fertility 
postponement with government policies playing little role. Again, it is 
frequently the inappropriate use of the TFR that causes this misleading 
message. 
 Current public discussions about fertility trends and policies in 
developed countries almost exclusively refer to the period TFR which has 
become the ubiquitous fertility indicator of choice since the 1960s and is 
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labelled as the ‘mean number of children per woman’ by many 
demographers and statistical offices and, in consequence, also by journalists 
and politicians. In the public discourse relatively few references are made to 
cohort fertility as the adequate measure of fertility or to other indicators of 
period fertility that may better reflect changes in fertility trends. Little 
reference is likewise made to trends in the absolute number of births, which 
after all directly determine the future size and age structure of the 
population. Although all demographers should be aware of the serious 
problems associated with calling the period TFR the ‘mean number of 
children per woman,’ a notion that only makes sense under a cohort 
perspective, there is hardly any public discussion about this. One important 
exception was a brief but heated public discussion in France in the early 
1990s, initiated by Hervé Le Bras’ attack on what he perceived as the ‘lies of 
natalism’ fuelled by an excessive focus on period fertility measures, 
especially the TFR, by the French National Demographic Institute, INED 
(see an excellent account by Keyfitz 1993).1 More recently the European 
Demographic Data Sheets (VID 2006 and 2008) have presented calculations 
of the TFRs adjusted for ‘tempo effect’ (i.e., the influence of changes in the 
timing of childbearing) along with traditional TFRs and cohort fertility 
measures in order to draw attention to this problem. 
 In discussing the use and usefulness of the period TFR this paper 
partly relates to a recent work by Ní Bhrolcháin (2007, 2008) who 
distinguishes between five purposes (‘reasons’) for which the TFR is being 
used and stresses that the choice of fertility indicator should be determined 
by the analyst’s objective. We go beyond this rather broad concept of 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, this debate focused on the choice between period and cohort fertility 
measures and practically took for granted that the TFR represents the period fertility 
measure of choice. However, the journal Population, published by INED, soon took 
up the issue of period fertility measurement and the interpretation of the TFR in a 
series of research and discussion papers (published in English in Population 1994; 
see Rallu and Toulemon 1994 and subsequent commentaries and authors’ reply in 
the same issue).  
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measurement purposes and focus primarily on policy-relevant analysis of 
fertility trends and the questions surrounding it. We believe that 
demographers are expected to address specific questions that have societal or 
policy relevance and communicate their research to broader public. For some 
of these questions (such as, how many school-age children can we expect in 
ten years) the most appropriate demographic measure to be provided is the 
absolute number of births (adjusted for child mortality and actual or 
expected migration), while for others (e.g. whether women have on average 
more children as a consequence of economic or political changes) measures 
of fertility level would give the best answer. As we will discuss in the 
concluding section, the well-established TFR index does not give a 
satisfactory answer to such ‘real world’ questions beyond the narrow arena 
of demographic modelling.  
 In the following we will try to demonstrate that the period TFR is a 
very problematic measure for assessing both the need for and the impact of 
policy changes and, more generally, for studying fertility trends in 
conjunction with selected social and economic trends. The excessive use of 
this problematic indicator, motivated in part by its wide availability for 
different countries and periods, can lead to erroneous conclusions. We will 
also address two natural follow-up questions (a) “Can we offer a better 
indicator of fertility level based on period information?”, and, if the answer 
is affirmative, (b) “Is there any role left for the traditional period TFR?” 
Most of the paper deals with the first question and compares the messages 
derived from the period TFR with those derived from three alternative 
measures of period fertility and from completed cohort fertility. The second 
question, which is more radical in its potential implications, is addressed in 
the concluding section.  
 The paper first reiterates the increasingly recognised fact that the 
period TFR can diverge considerably and systematically from the completed 
cohort TFR of women having children in a given period and this divergence 
can stretch over long periods of time. Timing effects and compositional 
factors affecting period TFR may be seen as undesired influences that 
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confound the link between fertility and policy. We present four examples 
where the period TFR is typically used as a criterion for an evaluation of the 
‘underlying’ level of fertility, often referred to as ‘fertility quantum’ 
(Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; van Imhoff 2001). We discuss whether the 
period TFR provides adequate and useful information about fertility levels 
and trends and whether this evaluation changes when other fertility 
indicators are used instead of the conventional period TFR. The first 
example concerns the presumed difference between the desired and actual 
fertility level in low-fertility countries. We show that this gap substantially 
diminishes if indicators other than the conventional period TFR, including 
the eventually achieved completed fertility, are used to assess fertility levels. 
Our second example focuses on a recent increase in the period TFR in many 
countries of Europe which has been often interpreted as a reversal of the 
previously declining trend. Using fertility indicators other than the ordinary 
TFR for two countries with a notable recent increase in the period TFR, the 
Czech Republic and Spain, we demonstrate that this trend is largely 
attributable to the slowing pace of fertility postponement, which had 
negatively affected the period TFR. This was particularly the case for first 
births, which accounted for most of the TFR increase. The third example 
discusses potential pitfalls of using the TFR as a measure of fertility of 
immigrant women and emphasises that it tends to exaggerate their level of 
fertility and thus also fertility differences between native and immigrant 
women. Finally, our fourth example brings the focus of our analysis to the 
policy effects. Drawing from the research on policy changes and fertility 
swings in Sweden, the Russian Federation and France, we conclude that 
policies which appear to give a boost to period fertility mostly lead to 
changes in the timing and spacing of births, but have only a limited durable 
effect on the quantum of fertility. 
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2  PROBLEMS WITH THE PERIOD TFR  
 An increasing number of studies have demonstrated that the period 
TFR is a questionable measure of the level (quantum) of period fertility. It 
controls neither for the parity distribution of women nor duration since the 
last birth, which are the key determining factors of reproductive behaviour 
(Rallu and Toulemon 1994a and Population 1994). Even more important, it 
is very sensitive to changes in the timing of childbearing, which inflate the 
TFR when women have children at progressively earlier ages and depress it 
when they postpone childbearing to later reproductive ages (e.g. Ryder 1990; 
Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Bongaarts 2002; Sobotka 2004a). The latter 
situation has been typical for most developed countries since the early 
1970s, when a long-term trend towards delayed parenthood started in 
western and northern Europe as well as in Canada, Japan and the United 
States (Kohler et al. 2002; Sobotka 2004b). Various estimates suggested that 
without this shift in the timing of childbearing period TFR in the European 
Union would have been by 0.2 to 0.3 higher in the late 1990s and early 
2000s (Lutz et al. 2003; Sobotka 2004a; VID 2008), although this tempo 
effect was strongly regionally differentiated (Bongaarts 2002; Frejka and 
Sobotka 2008). 
 As a result, the period TFR considerably diverged from the 
completed cohort fertility of women who were in their prime childbearing 
ages in a given period. Such a mismatch is not problematic for short-term 
fluctuations, when period fertility measures should reflect actual ups and 
downs in birth rates that may not affect ultimate cohort fertility trends (Ní 
Bhrolcháin 1992). However, this disagreement becomes problematic once 
the period TFR differs systematically from the corresponding completed 
cohort TFR for two or three decades, as it has happened across much of the 
developed world. Figure 1 gives an illustration of this divergence for 
Denmark, where the gap between the period TFR and roughly corresponding 
cohort TFR averaged 0.26 in the period of 1970-1994 (the corresponding 
cohort TFR cannot be computed yet for the younger cohorts). Such a long-
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term divergence implies that the period TFR provides incorrect signals about 
the levels and trends of fertility and, by extension, also about the long-term 
prospects of population replacement and population growth in the absence of 
migration. As Figure 1 shows, much of this gap can be effectively removed 
in the long run with period indicators that aim to eliminate tempo effects, 
including the adjusted TFR. 
 As an alternative to the period TFR, we use the following range of 
indicators of period fertility:  
• (a) adjusted period TFRs, proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney 
(1998), which are based on birth-order specific correction in the ordinary 
TFRs that reflect the changes in the mean ages of fertility schedule;  
• (b) an age and parity-specific index of fertility, PATFR (e.g. Rallu 
and Toulemon 1994a) which is based on fertility table that controls for age 
and parity distribution of women of reproductive age 
• (c) its variant adjusted for tempo and variance effects (Kohler and 
Ortega 2002).  
 We also employ completed cohort fertility. The choice of these 
indicators is driven in part by their suitability to address a given issue and in 
part by data availability. We are well aware of the shortcomings of the 
Bongaarts-Feeney adjustment, such as its simplified underlying assumption 
about the constant shape of fertility schedule, its lack of controlling for 
changes in the parity distribution of the female population and its relatively 
strong fluctuations over time (van Imhoff 2001; Schoen 2004). However, we 
use it alongside the adjusted PATFR for the reason of data availability and 
also because it gives in most cases very similar results to the other fertility 
adjustment methods. We do not dispose for a number of countries with 
potentially more appropriate indexes based on parity and duration since the 
last birth, which largely eliminate the need for tempo adjustment (Sobotka et 
al. 2005; Ní Bhrolcháin 2008). We provide a brief description of the 
indicators used in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1  Period TFR (1965-2008), adjusted period TFR (1970-2003) and 
completed cohort TFR (women born in 1937-1967) in Denmark. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data on completed cohort TFR are based on two neighbouring cohort groups; 
e.g. cohort 1937 refers to a cohort born in 1937-38. A small fraction of the 
completed cohort TFR is estimated for women born in 1960-67. Period data are 
compared with the cohort data for women born 27-28 years earlier; this distance 
corresponds approximately to the mean age at childbearing in 1968-1994. Adjusted 
TFR is an average value for a 3-years period centred on a given year.  
Sources: Council of Europe (2006) and Eurostat (2008, 2009) for the period TFR 
and adjusted TFR; Statistics Denmark 2007 (Tables 2.5 and 2.6) for the completed 
cohort TFR. 
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3  EXAMPLE 1: THE ASSUMED GAP BETWEEN DESIRED AND ACTUAL 
FERTILITY 
 Surveys on fertility ideals and intentions frequently indicate that 
despite the decline in fertility rates well below the replacement-level 
threshold, both mean ideal and desired family sizes in most countries of 
Europe remain at or above two children per woman (e.g. Testa 2007).2 The 
period TFR has been repeatedly used to estimate this gap, suggesting a huge 
discrepancy between actual and intended fertility (see also Bongaarts 2008), 
often in the order of 0.5-0.8 children per woman.3 A recent OECD analysis 
(OECD 2007: 36) posits that “the gaps between desired and actual fertility 
rates have increased over the past ten to twenty years” and suggests that 
these gaps are largest in countries where fertility rates are lowest. Several 
distinct explanations of this discrepancy have been proposed, among which 
institutional and structural constraints to childbearing and childrearing 
(McDonald 2006) are frequently taken as evidence of a need for a policy 
action (European Commission 2005; McDonald 2006).  
 The issue has been empirically illustrated by Lutz (2007); this 
illustration is further elaborated in Table 1. It combines four different 
fertility and family size indicators in major regions of the European Union 
(EU) and, separately, in Finland. The first column lists the personal ideal 
family size as collected in the Eurobarometer survey in 2006 for women 
aged 25-39 (Testa 2006). The second column, also based on Eurobarometer, 
gives the total intended family size for the same group of women. It 
combines the number of children already born with the number of children 
                                                 
2 Recent evidence for a number of European countries indicates, however, that 
young adult women increasingly express sub-replacement family size desires 
(Goldstein et al. 2003; Lutz et al. 2006; Sobotka 2009). 
3 For instance, Chesnais (2000: 133) stated: “…average ideal family size is around 
two (…), but the observed total fertility rate for the European Union is only 1.4. The 
difference between the number of children European women have and the number 
they would like is around 0.6 children per woman (or 6 children per 10 women)”. 
 11
women intend to have in the future. This second measure constitutes a more 
realistic predictor of fertility than ideal family size, since it takes into 
account expected obstacles and difficulties in realising their fertility ideals 
and desires. However, a comparison between these two measures from the 
same survey shows that there is only a small difference between them, 0.15 
children per woman for the whole EU.  
 
Table 1  Ideal and intended family size and total fertility rate among women 
in various regions of the EU in 2006 and different ways to calculate the 
‘gap’ between ideal (intended) and actual fertility. 
 (1) 
Personal 
ideal 
family 
size 
(2) 
Actual + 
intended 
family 
size 
(3) 
TFR 
 
(4) 
Tempo 
adjusted 
TFR 
(5) 
Gap 1 
(1)-(3)
(6) 
Gap 2 
(1)–(4) 
(7) 
Gap 3 
(2)-(4) 
Western Europe 2.44 2.36 1.88 2.00 0.56 0.44 0.36 
Northern Europe 2.57 2.35 1.85 1.96 0.72 0.61 0.40 
Southern Europe 2.08 1.81 1.37 1.47 0.71 0.61 0.34 
Austria + 
Germany 
2.07 1.88 1.34 1.59 0.74 0.48 0.28 
Central-Eastern 
Europe 
2.09 2.04 1.31 1.67 0.79 0.42 0.37 
Finland 2.61 2.62 1.84 1.91 0.77 0.70 0.71 
EU-27 2.21 2.06 1.53 1.72 0.68 0.49 0.35 
Note: Data are weighted by population size of countries in given regions 
Sources: Columns (1) and (2): Eurobarometer 2006 data analysed by Testa (2006). 
(3) and (4): VID 2008 
 
 
 The third and fourth columns in Table 1 list the TFR for 2006 and 
the Bongaarts-Feeney (1998) tempo-adjusted TFR for 2003-2005 as 
published in the European Demographic Data Sheet (VID 2008). The 
difference between the conventional TFR and the ideal family size (Gap 1 in 
Column 5) is indeed substantial—more than half a child in all regions—and 
 12
reaches 0.7 children for the EU. But the two figures used to construct this 
gap are not comparable because they measure very different things, one 
cohort ideals and the other tempo-distorted period fertility. If one wishes to 
compare the ideal family size to a period fertility measure, then tempo-
adjusted TFR would be more appropriate. And as Column 6 shows, the gap 
between those two indexes (Gap 2) becomes smaller and reaches 0.5 for the 
whole EU. The last column finally gives a third kind of gap, namely that 
between the intended family size and the adjusted TFR. This third gap is the 
smallest of all, ranging between 0.3 and 0.4 for different regions and 
reaching 0.35 for the EU; it represents about half of Gap 1.  
 These data make the population policy rationale based on trying to 
help couples reduce the presumed gap between desires and reality look much 
less convincing: Does this imply that governments have little reason to take 
action in countries like Austria and Germany that have a relatively small 
aggregate gap, but in the view of their governments undesirably low fertility 
rates? Probably not. On the other hand, high-fertility countries of northern 
Europe have a somewhat larger gap as measured this way. Should 
governments be more active in those countries which have a higher overall 
level of fertility? Probably not. In fact, Finland, which is listed in the table as 
an example of a country with very large Gaps 2 and 3, is often used as an 
example of what kind of policies governments in low-fertility countries 
should introduce in order to make it easier for couples to combine work and 
family. Hence the policy paradigm based on the presumed ‘unmet need for 
children’ is problematic on both counts; to some extent it reflects wishful 
thinking of policy makers and their implicit pronatalism. 
 While this analysis based on the most recent Eurobarometer data 
(Lutz 2007; Testa 2006) clearly illustrates the issue, there are some justified 
doubts about the validity and representativeness of this type of data from an 
opinion survey with limited sample size, which vastly increases the potential 
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margin of error (Testa 2006).4 Hence we also present a more in-depth 
analysis, using data from comparatively large surveys from three countries 
and focusing on the intended family size, which best reflects women’s and 
couples’ long-term childbearing plans. 
 First, we inspect period data on fertility intentions and fertility for 
women in the Czech Republic, where the difference between the period TFR 
and the mean intended family size (MIFS) widened rapidly when the period 
TFR plummeted in the 1990s (see Sobotka et al. 2008). With the mean 
intended family size remaining at 2.0 children per woman, the gap between 
MIFS and the period TFR reached as high as 0.8 in 1997 and still remained 
at 0.7 in 2005 (Table 2).5 The tempo-adjusted fertility indicators suggest a 
much smaller gap at or below 0.3 (the Bongaarts-Feeney adjusted TFR is 
shown in Table 2; the adjusted PATFR shows similar results). Although this 
difference between fertility intentions and the actual level of fertility is not 
negligible either, it offers a much less dramatic interpretation than the gap 
measured with the ordinary TFR.  
 Such comparisons between intentions and period fertility rates are 
problematic, however. They compare the cohort intentions for children to be 
born in the future to the period measures of current fertility behaviour. A 
comparison of intended fertility among selected cohorts of women, 
expressed when they were in their prime reproductive years, with their final 
completed fertility is methodologically preferable. A usual drawback of 
cohort fertility analysis—the need to wait 15-20 years for given cohorts to 
complete their planned fertility—constitutes the main obstacle in such 
comparisons.  
                                                 
4 The small sample size for individual countries, typically around 130 female 
respondents aged 25-39, was the main reason why we decided to compute Table 1 
for regions instead of giving examples for individual countries, which show a much 
larger variety in intentions and in the resulting intentions-fertility gaps. 
5 Note, however, that young adult women (below age 25) in the Czech Republic 
have adopted sub-replacement family size desires and their mean intended family 
size was estimated at 1.85 in 2005 (Sobotka et al. 2008). 
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Table 2  Gap between mean intended family size (MIFS) and period fertility 
measured with the TFR and with the alternative indicators of period fertility, 
Czech Republic, 1993-2005. 
 MIFS TFR Gap 1 adjTFR Gap 2 
Year (1) (2) (2)-(1) (3) (3)-(1) 
1993 2.16 1.67 0.49 1.99 0.17 
1997 2.00 1.17 0.82 1.70 0.30 
2005 2.00 1.28 0.72 1.71 0.29 
Average  2.05 1.37 0.68 1.80 0.25 
Note: MIFS refers to the mean intended family size among women aged 18-35 
(except in 1993, when the data refer to ages 18-44). Answers of undecided 
respondents were ignored. Adjusted TFR is an average value for a 3-years period 
centred on a given year.  
Sources: MIFS was computed from the data of the 1993 RHS survey, 1997 FFS 
survey and 2005 GGS survey (see Sobotka et al. 2008, Table 7). Fertility indicators: 
our computations from Eurostat (2008).  
 
 
 Frequently, cohort analysis may lead to conclusions that are very 
similar to the comparison based on adjusted period measures discussed 
above. In England and Wales different cohorts of women who were 
interviewed at age 27-29 about their fertility plans expressed the MIFS by 
about 0.3-0.4 higher than the period TFR at that time (see Smallwood and 
Jefferies 2003 for trends in MIFS over time). However, the eventual gap 
between their intentions and the ultimately achieved fertility level was 
reduced by about a half and typically reached only 0.1-0.2 (Table 3). 
 Similarly, in Austria the period TFR also gives an exaggerated 
picture of the extent of unrealised fertility desires. At the time Austrian 
women reach their typical age at childbearing the gap between their mean 
reproductive desires and the contemporary level of TFR commonly widens 
to 0.4-0.5. However, a comparison of fertility intentions at younger ages 
with completed fertility shows that the intention-behaviour gap becomes 
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substantially smaller, specifically, around 0.15 in the case of the cohorts 
1955-60 and 1966-70 analysed in Figure 2. This finding is again surprisingly 
consistent with the conclusions based on period-based tempo-adjusted 
measures of fertility.  
 
Table 3  Gap between the mean intended family size (MIFS), period TFR 
and completed cohort fertility in England and Wales (women aged 27-29, 
period 1979-96). 
 MIFS Period 
TFR 
Gap 1 Completed 
TFR 
Gap 2 
Years Cohort (1) (2) (2)-(1) (3) (3)-(1) 
1979-81 around 1952 2.12 1.84 0.28 2.05 0.07 
1982-84 around 1955 2.16 1.76 0.40 2.02 0.14 
1985-87 around 1958 2.16 1.79 0.37 1.99 0.17 
1988-90 around 1961 2.20 1.82 0.38 1.96 0.24 
1991-93 around 1964 2.09 1.79 0.30 1.92 (est) 0.17 
1994-96 around 1967 2.14 1.74 0.40 1.91 (est.)  0.23 
Average   2.15 1.79 0.36 1.98 0.17 
Notes: MIFS refers to the mean intended family size among women aged 27-29; 
answers of undecided respondents were ignored (see Smallwood and Jefferies 2003 
for alternative estimates of the MIFS based on different assumptions about uncertain 
respondents).   
Data on the completed cohort TFR are partly estimated for cohorts born around 
1964 and 1967.  
Sources: MIFS: Smallwood and Jefferies 2003, Table 1. Completed TFR: ONS 
2007, Table 10.2, pp. 56-57. 
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Figure 2  Differences between mean intended family size (MIFS), period 
TFR and completed cohort fertility (CTFR), Austrian women aged 25-30 
(years 1986 and 1996, cohorts 1956-60 and 1966-70). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: MIFS refers to the medium variant estimate of the mean desired family size 
among women aged 25-30 (see Sobotka 2009). 
Data on the cohort CTFR are partly estimated for the cohorts born in 1966-70.  
Sources: Sobotka’s (2009) computation from Microcensus (1986 and 1996) data 
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1950-65. Caution needs to be taken when interpreting these findings: 
aggregate consistency does not mean that most individuals achieve their 
intended family size. Fertility intentions are often uncertain (Westoff and 
Ryder 1977; Morgan 1981; Sobotka 2009) and subject to changes and 
revisions during the life course (Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2004; Liefbroer 
2009). The aggregate results represent an outcome of both under-achieving 
and over-achieving of the initial targets among individual women. 
Furthermore, the concepts of intended and ideal family size can both be 
criticised. The definition of intended fertility adds the number of children 
already born to those still intended, which makes any unplanned births in the 
past part of the total intended family size. This problem is avoided by the 
more hypothetical personal ideal family size which, on the other hand, is 
more detached from individual circumstances affecting reproductive 
behaviour, including infertility, and thus also harder to interpret. 
 
4  EXAMPLE 2: RECENT INCREASE IN THE PERIOD TFR IN EUROPE  
 Since the late 1990s many countries of Europe have recorded a 
notable increase in the period total fertility rate. In Belgium, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Latvia, Spain and Sweden, the TFR 
increased by more than 0.2 between 1998 and 2007. This has been generally 
interpreted as a welcome sign, indicating the much-needed reversal of the 
previous long-standing trend of declining period fertility rates, which in 
many countries of Europe had brought the TFR to ‘lowest-low’ levels of 1.3 
or below (Kohler et al. 2002). Some governments have proudly attributed 
this trend to their policy action and a leading newspaper in Germany, Die 
Zeit, commented a tiny increase in the number of births in 2007 with the 
cheerful pronouncement “politics work!” (Gaschke 2009). However, an 
alternative explanation provides a different perspective on the recent rise in 
the period TFR. It is possible that much of the recent increase in the period 
TFR in European countries can be attributed to the slowing down or ending 
of fertility postponement. We look at fertility changes in two countries—the 
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Czech Republic and Spain—which experienced a substantial rise in the 
period TFR since the late 1990s and for which we could compute alternative 
indicators of period fertility that are less affected by the tempo effect. A 
systematic analysis of the role of tempo effects in the recent TFR increase is 
provided in a recent study by Goldstein et al. (2009). 
 Spain experienced a steep and continuous decline in the period TFR 
between 1976 and 1996, when it reached a record-low level of 1.17. At the 
same time the alternative tempo-adjusted indicators of period fertility also 
displayed an almost continuous fall, although at somewhat higher levels, 
suggesting that the fertility ‘quantum’ fell in parallel with the period TFR 
(Figure 3a). After 1996 the TFR first stabilised and then started rising, 
reaching 1.39 in 2007 (e.g. Delgado et al. 2008). However, the tempo-
adjusted fertility indicators give another perspective on recent fertility 
‘reversal’. First, they suggest that fertility was declining until 2000, i.e. 
during the time when the TFR had stabilised and started to increase. 
Subsequently, these indicators essentially show a stabilisation, possibly a 
tiny increase, in period fertility. In effect, there was convergence between 
the period TFR and the adjusted period fertility measures around 2005 when 
the increase in the mean age at first birth stopped. This is a nice illustration 
of the expected consequence of the ending of the tempo effect.  
 A different story is depicted in Figure 3b for the Czech Republic. 
A massive postponement of childbearing after the collapse of the state-
socialist system has taken place there since the early 1990s, bringing a 
pronounced rise in the mean age at first birth (Sobotka et al. 2008). In 
parallel, the TFR had fallen to the level of 1.13 in 1999 and then started a 
gradual recovery since the early 2000s, reaching 1.50 in 2008. The adjusted 
TFR as well as the age- and parity-specific index of fertility, the PATFR, 
adjusted for tempo effects (Kohler and Ortega’s 2002 adjustment, see 
Appendix) fell much less precipitously over the 1990s to a level around 1.6 
in 1998. This divergence between the ordinary TFR and the tempo-adjusted 
indicators indicates that a substantial part of the steep drop in the TFR could 
be attributed to the tempo effect. In contrast to Spain, a rise in the TFR in the 
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early 2000s occurred in tandem with an increase in the adjusted TFR albeit a 
less intensive one. It is likely that the continuing rise in the ordinary TFR 
will bring a gradual convergence between different fertility measures in the 
future, in reaction to a slowing down of fertility postponement. 
 
 20
Figure 3a  Period TFR, adjusted TFR, adjusted PATFR index and mean age 
at first birth in Spain, 1980-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b  Period TFR, adjusted TFR, adjusted PATFR index and mean age 
at first birth in the Czech Republic, 1988-2008. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: For adjusted TFR and PATFR average values for 3-year periods centred on a 
given year are shown. 
Sources: Authors’ computations based on Eurostat (2003 and 2008), INE (2008) and 
the data provided by the Czech Statistical Office. 
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 In these two cases, and many others not discussed here (e.g. 
Goldstein et al. 2009), the adjusted indicators offer a different interpretation 
of recent fertility trends than the ordinary TFR. Whereas the TFR provides 
an impression of a substantial increase in fertility rates, the adjusted 
indicators often show that this increase was almost entirely (Spain) or largely 
(Czech Republic) driven by the diminishing tempo distortion. 
 This explanation is particularly pertinent for first births, for which 
the recent rise in the TFR was most clearly manifested. To illustrate this 
point, we compare the ordinary TFR for birth order 1 with the period fertility 
index based on age-specific probabilities of having first child computed for 
childless women (PATFR), which is markedly less affected by the tempo 
effect (Sobotka 2004b), and its adjusted variant (adjPATFR) computed using 
a simplified version (Sobotka 2004b: 94) of Kohler and Ortega’s (2002) 
adjustment (see Appendix).  
 In the case of Spain, these three indexes provide contrasting 
impressions about the trends and levels of first-birth rates. Between 1980, 
when they stood at around 0.9 (suggesting 10% childlessness) and 2005, 
when they converged, although at a lower level below 0.8, the first-order 
TFR had dramatically fallen to 0.57 in 1996 and subsequently rose by a third 
during the next decade (Figure 4a). In contrast, the first-order PATFR 
depicts a gradual fall between 1980 and 1996 followed by a stabilisation. In 
other words, first-birth intensity did not rise after 1996 and almost all the 
increase in first-order TFR in Spain can be explained by a mechanical effect 
of a steep increase in the number of childless women at higher childbearing 
ages, when first-birth intensities remained relatively high and stable. This 
effect is not accounted for in order-specific TFR, which does not control for 
shifts in the parity distribution among women. Finally, when taking both 
tempo- and parity-composition effects into account the adjusted PATFR 
suggests that first-birth intensities actually declined between 1996 and 2004.   
 Likewise, in the Czech Republic, a substantial part of the dramatic 
fall in the first-order TFR, which took place between 1991 (0.91) and 1996 
(0.52) could be attributed to the tempo effect (Figure 4b). Remarkably, the 
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first-order adjPATFR only showed a modest decline to 0.86 in 1996-1999. 
Later, a rapid rise in the first-order TFR to 0.73 in 2008 was only weakly 
mirrored by a slow rise in first-order PATFR. Again, changing parity 
composition and diminishing tempo effect rather than a genuine increase in 
first-birth intensity provide the main explanation of the observed increase in 
the TFR. 
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Figure 4a  Period TFR, adjusted TFR and adjusted PATFR index for first 
births, Spain 1980-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4b  Period TFR, adjusted TFR and adjusted PATFR index for first 
births, the Czech Republic, 1988-2008. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: For adjusted TFR and PATFR average values for 3-year periods centred on a 
given year are shown. 
Sources: Authors’ computations based on Eurostat (2003 and 2008), INE (2008) and 
the data provided by the Czech Statistical Office. 
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 In sum, during the recent period the ordinary TFR usually indicates 
a larger magnitude of change, especially for first births, than fertility 
indicators which control for parity, duration, tempo effect, or at least some of 
these potentially distorting factors. Most of the TFR shifts can be explained 
by an increase in first-order TFR and, in turn, most of the increase in first-
order TFR can be explained by a diminishing tempo effect coupled with an 
increase in the number of childless women at later childbearing ages. The 
often dramatic reversals in first-order TFR can be seen as a product of two 
distinct phases of first-birth postponement, when many cohorts of women 
first delayed their entry into motherhood, causing a decline in the TFR and 
later contributed to the recuperation of fertility rates at higher childbearing 
ages, which pushed the ordinary TFR upwards. The analysis of first-birth 
rates, where the cycle of fertility delay and subsequent recuperation is most 
apparent and fuels large shifts in the first-order TFR, best exposes the 
weaknesses of the conventional period total fertility rate when it is used as a 
measure of childbearing intensity or as a synthetic cohort indicator of the 
‘number of children per woman’. 
 
5  EXAMPLE 3: TFR AS A PROBLEMATIC MEASURE OF THE FERTILITY OF 
IMMIGRANTS 
 Fertility of immigrants, when measured by the period TFR, is 
subject to yet another type of distortion linked to the endogeneity of 
migration for fertility. Immigrant women, especially when migration took 
place for the purpose of family formation, typically show elevated fertility 
rates during the first years after their arrival (e.g. Alders 2000; Østby 2002; 
Toulemon and Mazuy 2004; Andersson 2004). Consequently, their fertility 
rates are often more closely related to the duration of their stay rather than to 
their age. The total fertility rate, which takes age as the indexing variable of 
fertility, may therefore be strongly biased by the size of immigration 
streams: Even when fertility rates computed by the duration of stay in the 
country remain stable, increased migration would bring an inflated TFR by 
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increasing the number of migrant women with short durations of stay, when 
their fertility rates are highest. Thus, the TFR computed for immigrants 
usually exaggerates their fertility quantum during periods of high 
immigration.  
 This distortion becomes yet more serious when the data on births are 
recorded for women with foreign nationality only, rather than for all women 
of immigrant origin. As many immigrants undergo a process of 
naturalisation when they stay in a country for many years and at some point 
become classified as nationals, foreigners frequently constitute a select 
group of migrants with relatively short duration of stay and thus also with 
elevated period total fertility rates. This may explain why several European 
countries record the TFR for foreign women as high as 3.0 and above (e.g. 
Sobotka 2008). For instance, the TFR for foreign women in France in 2005 
was estimated at 3.29 as compared with 1.80 for women with French 
nationality (Héran and Pison 2007). For these reasons, some researchers 
have argued that the period TFR cannot serve as a reliable indicator of the 
level of immigrants’ fertility (Andersson 2004; Toulemon 2004).  
 Not much research has been conducted yet to correct for this type of 
distortion in the TFR. Alternative estimates of migrant women’s TFR for 
France controlling for age at entry and duration of stay (Toulemon and 
Mazuy 2004; Toulemon 2004) constitute the main exception. For 1991-1998 
this alternative estimate reduced the TFR of immigrant women in France 
from 2.50 (estimated by using the conventional TFR) to 2.16. Thus, the 
‘excess’ fertility of immigrant women in France as compared to native 
women, falls to about one half of its estimated level, from 0.85 to 0.46 when 
a more appropriate fertility indicator is used (Toulemon 2004: 4).  
 
6  EXAMPLE 4: CHANGES IN FAMILY POLICIES AND SHIFTS IN TFR  
 So far our analysis has not referred explicitly to family policies. 
There is an increasing body of evidence that family-related policies can 
stimulate distinct swings in total fertility rates, which are often primarily 
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induced by changes in fertility timing and spacing rather than by an increase 
in the underlying fertility quantum. Specifically, policies may stimulate 
earlier entry into parenthood or, which is more frequently the case, a faster 
progression to higher-order births.  
 The effects of changes in family policies on the timing of births have 
been documented for many European countries. For instance, Sweden 
constitutes a well-studied example of a sudden upswing in second- and third-
birth rates at short durations since previous birth. This upswing followed two 
extensions of parental leave, which granted a continuous provision of paid 
parental leave benefit to women who had another child within 24 months 
from 1980 and 30 months from 1986 (e.g. Hoem 1990; Andersson et al. 
2006; Neyer and Andersson 2008). This regulation, which became known as 
‘speed premium’, has led to a shortening of birth intervals and contributed to 
a distinct upward swing in period TFR in the late 1980s, as many parents 
found it manageable to have children closely spaced to take advantage of the 
continuous benefit (Hoem 1990).6  
 Less well-known are the effects of policy changes introduced in 
Russia since 1982. These policies extended the period of maternity leave 
and, more importantly, they also extended the options for mothers to take 
child care leave until the child reached age 3 (see Zakharov 2006 and 2008).7 
                                                 
6 Leave compensation in Sweden is generous: parents on parental leave are entitled 
to receive 80% of their previous salary (90% until 1994; Andersson et al. 2006: 52, 
fn. 5), which is determined by income before the birth of the child. Thus parents 
who resume work before having another child risk receiving smaller parental leave 
benefit if they work part-time or lose their initial job. This creates an economic 
incentive for the couples to space their next child within the eligibility interval for 
the continuous parental leave (Hoem 1990).  
7 Unlike in Sweden, child care leave compensation was low in Russia and since 
1982 amounted to around 20% of the average salary from the end of maternity leave 
to the time the child reached the age of 18 months (with the exception of mothers of 
sick children, who received their full salary) and it was unpaid thereafter (Zakharov 
2008).   
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Following this new regulation, the TFR in Russia increased from 1.88 in 
1981 to 2.09 in 1983 and, after a short pause, to 2.23 in 1987 (Council of 
Europe 2006). However, what looks like a successful policy intervention that 
brought about a desired increase in fertility was mostly an indirect effect of a 
change in the timing of childbearing, bringing a temporary boost to the 
period TFR. The mean age at first birth slightly declined, but the most 
pronounced effect was recorded for women with one child, who were giving 
birth to their second child at considerably shorter intervals. In a period 
perspective, this second-birth interval fell from around 5.5 to 3.5 years 
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s (Zakharov 2008, Figure 5). 
Although second children were born much ‘faster’ than before, especially for 
women born in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, Zakharov (2008) did not 
detect any increase in their cohort progression rate to second child. He 
concludes that “the demographic effect of the policy did not manifest itself 
in an increase in average family size in any major social groups.”  
 However, not only the period TFR is very sensitive to changes in the 
timing of childbearing. Changes in birth intervals, which are frequent by-
products of family policy changes, also affect period parity progression rates 
(PPRs), computed on the basis of duration-specific fertility rates. Breton and 
Prioux’s (2005) detailed analysis of shifts in third-birth rates in France in the 
1970s to 1990s reveal that third-birth PPRs have fluctuated in parallel with 
an introduction of family policies explicitly aimed at promoting third births 
(set up in 1978-1980 and again in 1985-87) as well as with the scaling-down 
of those measures in 1982. As in the previous two cases, these policies had 
primarily led to the temporary compression of birth intervals—in this case 
between the second and the third child—and had only a limited effect on 
cohort fertility rates8 (Breton and Prioux 2005: 423).  
 
                                                 
8 In the study of Breton and Prioux (2005) cohorts were defined as parity cohorts 
which measure progression rates to third birth among women having a second birth 
in a given year. 
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7  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 This study has discussed four examples of different situations where 
the use of the period TFR results in erroneous readings of the levels and 
trends of period fertility, which in turn may or did lead to incorrect policy 
conclusions and, potentially, to misguided policies. 
 Our first example makes it clear that the popular and politically 
convenient policy rationale according to which governments should only try 
to help couples fill the gap between their desired and actual family size is 
ambiguous and not very significant in terms of quantity. We arrive at the 
same conclusion when using adjusted period measures as well as when using 
the more appropriate cohort comparison of fertility intentions among women 
of reproductive age and their later reproductive outcomes. A much smaller 
aggregate difference between intended and realised fertility can be more 
easily explained by biological and social obstacles to childbearing 
(Bongaarts 2008) that are largely outside the scope of policy influences, such 
as poor health, infertility, or an inability to find a suitable partner. By 
extension, our findings suggest that policies aimed at stimulating higher 
fertility preferences might be more effective in some of the low-fertility 
countries than the policies only focusing on this rather narrow gap. However, 
fertility policies that go beyond the rationale of trying to bridge the supposed 
gap between preferences and outcomes may turn out to be controversial. 
 Our second example reflects upon the most widely documented 
distortion in the period TFR—its sensitivity to changes in the timing of 
childbearing. We show that the period TFR may suggest a trend reversal and 
a substantial increase in fertility where other indicators show stagnation or 
even a slight downward trend (the example of first births in Spain) and that 
the difference between the period TFR and the more appropriate measures of 
period fertility level may be of major magnitude, potentially leading to a 
gross misinterpretation of fertility in a country (the example of the Czech 
Republic). Our analysis indicates that most of the recent increase in the 
period TFR has been driven by the rise in the TFR for first births, which can 
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in turn be largely attributed to the diminishing first-birth postponement 
combined with a previous increase in the number of childless women at later 
childbearing ages (see also Goldstein et al. 2009). The positive impact of 
diminishing tempo distortion on the TFR had been foreseen in many 
analyses of fertility trends during the last decade (Bongaarts 2002; Lutz et al. 
2003; Sobotka 2004a). This finding has an important policy corollary: while 
the rising TFR may be interpreted by some governments and politicians as 
proving the positive effects of their social or family policies on fertility, our 
findings leave much less space for such a cheerful interpretation.  
 Our third example draws on the existing research on fertility of 
immigrant women. The fact that the TFR often distorts the picture of 
immigrants’ fertility may potentially lead to ill-informed policy efforts 
addressing the presumably high difference between fertility of migrant and 
native-born women. Our fourth example turns to policy effects themselves. 
Many fertility-related policies primarily affect the timing of childbearing and 
as a result they also bring a temporary shift in the period TFR without 
shaping cohort fertility trends. This shift, caused mostly by the tempo effect, 
may please policymakers who are likely to incorrectly interpret it as a 
welcome sign of the effectiveness of the new policy measures.  
 Let us now turn to the second question mentioned in the 
introduction, namely whether there is any role left for the traditional period 
TFR. We have presented clear evidence that it may grossly distort any 
policy-relevant analysis. Does this imply that the use of period TFR should 
be entirely abandoned? On a theoretical level the answer essentially depends 
on whether or not the period TFR adequately measures and describes some 
process that can be meaningfully interpreted and that other fertility 
indicators do not capture in the same way (see also Ní Bhrolcháin 2007 and 
2008). In the spectrum of summary indicators of natality and period fertility 
that ranges from the absolute number of births per year (influenced by 
population size, age structure, parity and birth interval distribution of 
women, as well as tempo effects) at one end to  parity, age and duration-
specific indexes on the other, the period TFR occupies an odd in-between 
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position. It adjusts for size and age structure but not for tempo, parity or 
birth intervals distribution. The decisive point then is whether there are any 
meaningful questions for which the answer would be provided by an 
indicator which only adjusts for age structure and not for other potentially 
important factors.9 
 We could not come up with a policy-relevant question for which the 
period TFR would be our indicator of choice. All questions that were 
considered in the end either related to age structure, cohort size or population 
growth for which the simple natality indicators provide the adequate answer 
or pertained to childbearing behaviour, such as the question whether a 
certain policy has led to a higher fertility rate. The latter question, in order to 
be adequately addressed, requires controlling for parity or duration 
composition and tempo effect or turning to a cohort fertility analysis. The 
only instances for which we could identify a role for the period TFR is the 
artificial realm of models of age-structured population dynamics constructed 
by demographers. And of course, in this realm the TFR still provides the best 
answer to the question “Did the TFR increase?” And since the TFR is such 
an established measure, a lot of people will keep asking this question. 
 The influence of the changed timing of childbearing on the period 
TFR is in our view particularly pertinent to current policy debates and 
proposals. Although the efforts to eliminate the tempo effect from period 
fertility measures remain by definition imperfect and subject to criticism, 
they are in our view worth undertaking. Policy-relevant questions are usually 
                                                 
9 By extension, this question also pertains to the issue of the factors that should be 
controlled for in an ideal fertility index of choice (see Population 1994). In theory, 
such a list can be extended to include factors like infertility, partnership status of 
women, or even their education status or fertility preferences (only women wishing 
to have a child in a given year would be included in the at-risk population). 
However, lack of data, measurement and computational problems as well as 
interpretation difficulties of such measures imply that the list of characteristics to be 
controlled for in any useful fertility index should be limited to the most essential 
ones.  
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concerned with the ‘quantum’ of fertility, including the issues of anticipating 
future period and cohort fertility levels and population prospects or 
explaining trends and reversals in fertility. The presumed mismatch between 
fertility intentions and behaviour is a prime example of an anticipatory use 
of period indicators used to show this mismatch, where the tempo effect 
strongly biases both the analysis and the resulting conclusions. Also from the 
perspective of shorter-term trends and reversals in fertility, most policies that 
have potential effects on fertility are arguably ‘quantum-oriented’: If, for 
instance, a new system of parental leave is established, few politicians 
hoping that it may have a positive influence on fertility would be content to 
learn that this influence may last for a couple of years only, because it would 
primarily operate through a tempo effect temporarily boosting the period 
TFR. What they are more likely to have on their mind is a long-term 
sustained boost to fertility level (‘quantum’). 
 These considerations seem to imply that there is indeed little use for 
the period TFR outside the models constructed by demographers. Still, these 
considerations have often been labelled as ‘theoretical’ because they are 
contingent on the availability of a broadly accepted better indicator of period 
quantum. While there are many useful indicators, we are unable to 
recommend any one as a ‘default’ indicator of choice, since they are based 
on different underlying models of behaviour that are not universally 
accepted (Population 1994) and that may not suit all types of measurement 
purposes (Ní Bhrolcháin 2007, 2008). Given this situation, a parallel use of 
several indicators, carefully selected on the basis of data availability and also 
of the research question asked, should be considered (Ní Bhrolcháin 2008). 
If the goal is to get information on the average childbearing intensity in a 
given year (the period quantum of fertility), we recommend choosing parity 
progression ratios, tempo-adjusted PATFRs or TFRs, or other indicators that 
at least partly reduce the distorting influences of age structure, parity 
distribution and the tempo effect. Especially the use of duration- and parity-
specific fertility measures would provide a much better understanding of 
policy effects on fertility than the ordinary TFR can offer (Ní Bhrolcháin 
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1987, 1992, 2008). Recently initiated efforts to collect and compute detailed 
and unified sets of order-specific fertility indicators within the framework of 
the ‘Human Fertility Database’ should make a wider use of such indicators 
much easier in the future. Ultimately, cohort fertility data are best suited to 
analyse whether specific policies have had a lasting effect or whether there 
was a discontinuity in fertility trends among the cohorts that reacted most 
strongly to the policy changes. While ordinary cohort fertility data, specified 
by year-of-birth cohorts require a long ‘waiting time’ for each cohort to 
complete its reproductive history, data for parity cohorts, namely, fertility 
rates and parity progression ratios specified by duration since last previous 
birth can reduce this drawback (Breton and Prioux 2005 and Hosseini-
Chavoshi et al. 2006 constitute nice recent examples of such analysis).  
 Our findings on the problematic use and interpretation of the period 
TFR, which should be avoided where possible, are in agreement with earlier 
arguments of prominent analysts like Norman Ryder (1990), Máire Ní 
Bhrolcháin (1992, 2008), Jean-Louis Rallu and Laurent Toulemon (1994b) 
and John Bongaarts and Griffith Feeney (1998). While we also generally 
agree with a recent conclusion offered by Neyer and Andersson (2007: 22) 
who proposed that crude measures of fertility, such as the TFR, cannot serve 
as appropriate measures of policy effects, we do not fully support their claim 
that an accurate information on fertility changes following the changes in 
family policies can only be derived from individual-level data (see also 
Neyer and Andersson 2008). While this may be true for the study of 
differential fertility behaviour, a carefully drawn interpretation of a wide 
range of aggregate level fertility indicators can provide crucial insights into 
the nature of fertility changes in response to specific new policies or other 
social and economic changes, frequently allowing researchers to draw valid 
and important causal inferences (Ní Bhrolcháin and Dyson 2007).  
 In conclusion, there is a strong case for stopping the use of the 
period TFR as a one-fits-all fertility indicator which is currently common 
practice. While demographers are increasingly aware of the pitfalls 
associated with the period TFR, their continuous reliance on this measure 
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fuels large misperceptions of fertility levels and dynamics among policy 
makers, the media and the general public. As a minimum reporting standard, 
demographers who still choose to use the period TFR should stop referring 
to it as the ‘mean number of children per woman’, which it evidently is not. 
The choice of the most appropriate indicator must depend on the question 
asked. Since it is hard to think of a real-world question for which the TFR 
would be the indicator of choice there are good reasons for abandoning it 
altogether in communications with non-demographic audiences who almost 
inevitably will misinterpret it as a cohort measure. But such a radical 
solution may be premature as long as there is no widely accepted and easily 
available alternative. Hence, for pragmatic reasons, the TFR should still 
remain in use as part of a bouquet of fertility indicators. As the period TFR 
is most widely available and it often rises and falls in line with other 
indicators it is still worth being calculated and inspected. But its misleading 
‘cohort’ interpretation should be avoided and, wherever possible, more 
appropriate indicators should be used.  
 Given that it has become so dear to many cohorts of demographers 
and data users it would take quite a while for the period TFR to lose its 
dominant position in fertility reporting and analysis even if the points made 
in this paper were readily accepted. We hope nevertheless that our study will 
stimulate a discourse about the best practice of fertility reporting and will 
contribute to the broader dissemination of different fertility measures which 
will more accurately inform policy makers and the public at large about the 
aspects of fertility change that matter for their questions. 
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Appendix 
Fertility indicators used in this study 
Besides the period and cohort total fertility rates, specified separately for 
first births and for total birth orders, this study utilises the following 
indicators of period fertility: 
 
Tempo-adjusted total fertility rate (adjTFR), developed by Bongaarts and 
Feeney (1998), is computed a sum of order-specific adjusted TFRs, which 
take order-specific changes in the mean age of fertility schedule as an 
adjustment factor: 
adjTFRi(t) = TFRi(t) / (1-ri(t)),  
where ri(t) is the estimated change in the mean age at childbearing of birth 
order i between the beginning and the end of year t. Following Bongaarts 
and Feeney (2000: 563, fn. 1), this is estimated as follows: 
ri(t) = [MABi(t+1) – MABi(t-1)] / 2,  
where MABi(t) is the mean age of fertility schedule of order i, calculated 
from age- and order-specific fertility rates of the second kind (incidence 
rates). Since the adjTFR displays considerable annual fluctuations, three-
year moving averages are used in this study.  
 
Fertility index controlling for age and parity (PATFR) is computed from 
a set of age and parity-specific birth probabilities, qi(a), which serve as an 
input of multistate fertility tables (e.g. Park 1976). Following Rallu and 
Toulemon (1994a: 66), order-specific birth probabilities are computed 
directly from the annual data on live births by age of mother (a) and birth 
order (i) combined with the parity and age structure of the female population 
at the beginning of a given year: 
qi(a,t) = Bi(a,t) / PF,i-1(a,T=January 1 of t). 
This equation expresses the probability that a woman aged a and having i-1 
children at the beginning of a year t will give birth during the year. For more 
details of the computations used, see Sobotka (2004b, pp. 44-46 and 92-93). 
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For further information on age and parity-specific fertility index and its 
computation, see Park (1976), Rallu and Toulemon (1994a) and Barkalov 
and Dorbritz (1996).  
 
Tempo and variance-adjusted period fertility index controlling for age 
and parity (adjPATFR). 
This modification of the PATFR index was proposed by Kohler and Ortega 
(2002). Their method provides an estimation of period fertility that is free of 
three distortions present in the TFR, namely distortions caused by (1) 
changes in the parity distribution of women, (2) changes in fertility timing 
and (3) changes in the variance of the fertility schedule. It is an analogy of 
the method developed first by Kohler and Philipov (2001) for an adjustment 
of age- and order-specific fertility rates of the second kind (incidence rates). 
The authors employ a procedure that iteratively corrects the observed mean 
age and the inferred tempo for distortions caused by the variance effects 
(Kohler and Philipov, 2001: 10). We employ a simplified version of this 
adjustment, which is described in Sobotka (2004b: 94). As in the case of 
adjTFR, we use three-year moving averages of the adjPATFR to reduce 
random fluctuations in this index. 
